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The Court qualified its conclusion by
stating: "we need not rule out the possi-
bility of showing the kind of threat to fair
trial rights that would possess the requi-
site degree of certainty to justify re-
straint. Id. at 2808.
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices
Stewart and Marshall, concurred in the
Chief Justice's judgment, but stated he
would hold that with respect to criminal
proceedings in particular, prior restraints
on freedom of the press are not permis-
sible under the Constitution. "Discus-
sion of public affairs in a free society
cannot depend on the preliminary grace
of judicial censors." Id. at 2809. Justices
White and Stevens, in concurrences,
implied agreement to Justice Brennan's
position. However, the holding as deli-
vered by the Chief Justice was some-
what limited to the facts of the case:
"We hold that, with respect to the order
entered in this case prohibiting reporting
or commentary on judicial proceedings
held in public, the barriers have not been
overcome; to the extent that this order
restrained publication of such material, it
is clearly invalid. To the extent that it
prohibited publication based on infor-
mation gained from other sources, we
conclude that the heavy burden im-
posed as a condition to securing a prior
restraint was not met and the judgment
of the Nebraska Supreme Court is there-




Standing to Enjoin Maryland
Health Officials' Practices Ab-
sent National Emergency.
In a case filed on July 8, 1976 in the
U.S. District Court for the District of
Maryland, the Attorney General of the
United States brought suit on behalf of
the United States to enjoin certain Mary-
land health officials' practices and
policies which allegedly deprive men-
tally retarded residents of Rosewood
State Hospital of their constitutional
rights under the Eighth, Thirteenth and
Fourteenth Amendments of the Con-
stitution. United States v. Solomon, 45
U.S.L.W. 2039, (U.S. July 8, 1976)
The defendants filed a Motion to Dis-
miss on the ground that the Attorney
General had no authority or standing to
bring this action. Chief Judge Edward S.
Northrup granted the defendants' Mo-
tion to Dismiss stating that the executive
branch of the government does not ex-
tend to bringing such a suit absent a
showing by the United States of a situa-
tion of national emergency.
In a lengthy opinion, Judge Northrup
presented the plaintiffs' contentions
from constitutional, statutory, and
common law standpoints, but in each in-
stance emphatically concluded that the
government lacked standing. The court
did not express an opinion on the merits
of the underlying issue regarding the
care and treatment of the mentally re-
tarded in Maryland. The conclusion
simply means that lawsuits aimed at pro-
tecting these individuals' rights must be
brought by the proper plaintiffs.
This case brought considerable atten-
tion from other states. Texas and
Pennsylvania filed amicus curiae briefs
in support of the defendants' position.
The government appealed Judge North-
rup's decision, arguing its case before
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals on
September 8, 1976.
Maryland's Mechanic's Lien
Law Upheld-Or Was It?
Maryland's two hundred-year-old
mechanic's lien statute came within
inches of being declared void by the
Maryland Court of Appeals in Barry
Properties, Inc. v. Fick Bros. Roofing
Co., 277 Md. 15, 353 A.2d 222 (1976).
Barry v. Fick was the first known case in
Maryland which dealt with the constitu-
tionality of the mechanic's lien law and
the applicability thereto of the due pro-
cess clauses of Article 23 of the Mary-
land Declaration of Rights and the Four-
teenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitu-
tion.
Fick Brothers Roofing Company
(Fick) filed a bill of complaint to enforce a
mechanic's lien against the property of
Barry Properties, Inc. (Barry). Fick com-
plied with the applicable Maryland stat-
utes and the Maryland Rules of Proce-
dure in filing, and the lower court ren-
dered a decision in its favor, from which
Barry appealed on the ground that the
Maryland mechanic's lien law deprives
the owner of property without pro-
cedural due process. The law authorizes
the lien to be imposed without notice or
an opportunity for a prior hearing.
The appellant's case emanated from,
and is analogous to, four recent Su-
preme Court decisions, each of which
addresses the question of whether cer-
tain statutory prejudgment creditor re-
medies are consonant with the due pro-
cess clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. The court in its majority opinion
by Judge Eldridge, attempted to review
Barry v. Fick in light of these recent deci-
sions, but somehow arrived at a different
conclusion.
The court held that for the mechanic's
lien statute to meet the requirements of
due process, two prerequisites must
exist: (1) there must be state action,
Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.,
419 U.S. 345, 349-50 (1974), and (2)
the imposition of the lien under the
Maryland statute must constitute a sig-
nificant taking of property.
In response to the first prerequisite,
the court reasoned that since the liens
are created, regulated, and enforced by
the State, then they are considered state
action. The second prerequisite was met
by the rationale that even though the
property owner still had possession, he
did not have unfettered tide, as in this
case, where the appellant was unable to
obtain the balance on its construction
loan. Since both of the prerequisites
were met, the court concluded that the
mechanic's lien law is incompatible with
both Article 23 of the Maryland Declara-
tion of Rights and the Fourteenth
Amendment.
The final issue to be decided was
whether, considering the unconstitu-
tionality of the lien law, all or part of the
statute should be abrogated. In deciding
this issue the court looked to the legisla-
tive intent of the General Assembly in
enacting the mechanic's lien statutes.
The intent was to insure, by means of a
mechanic's lien, that the persons who
have contributed labor or materials to a
construction project would be compen-
sated for their contributions. Applying
the legislative intent to the facts, the
court decided that notwithstanding the
unconstitutionality of the statute, the ap-
pellant was afforded due process in that
Barry had been provided with notice of
the hearing.
Judge Levine agreed with the majori-
ty's reasoning, but strongly disagreed
with the result. He could not imagine
how a statute rendered facially uncon-
stitutional and violative of the Four-
teenth Amendment could be constitu-
tional in its application to a given case.
Even though Barry v. Fick did not
conclusively abrogate Maryland's
mechanic's lien law, the court placed it in
a tenuous position, leaving the law sub-




The Maryland Court of Special Ap-
peals, in two recent decisions, expanded
the State's burden of proof requirement
in a trial for murder, but arrived at differ-
ent conclusions in respect to the trial
judge's failure to instruct the jury that the
burden of negating mitigation in a mur-
der charge was on the State.
In Garland v. State, 29 Md. App. 27,
349 A.2d 374 (1975), the defendant
was convicted by a jury of second degree
murder, During the trial, the defendant
contended that he killed his victim in a
"hot-blooded response to a legally
adequate provocation in the course of
mutual combat." Evidence produced by
the defendant and the State was enough
to generate a jury issue on the subject of
mitigation due to provocation, which, if
found, would reduce the crime from
second degree murder to manslaughter,
The court followed Evans v. State. 28
Md. App. 640, 349 A.2d 300 (1975),
which placed the burden on the State to
prove the absence of a defensive issue
once the issue, such as mitigation, has
been fairly generated by the evidence.
Since the defendant raised the issue of
mitigation, the onus was on the State to
negate the defensive issue and the re-
sponsibility was on the trial judge to in-
struct the jury that the State had the bur-
den; if the jurors were not persuaded by
the State beyond a reasonable doubt,
the verdict would be manslaughter. The
court held that the trial judge failed to
properly instruct the jury. His incomplete
instructions did not pass the constitu-
tional muster recently set forth by the
Supreme Court in Mullaney v. Wilbur,
421 U.S. 684 (1975)
Conversely, in Dorsey & Wilson u'
State, 29 Md. App 97, 349 A.2d 414
(1975), the court decided that the failure
of the trial judge to instruct the jury of the
State's burden to negate mitigation was
harmless error and would not upset the
conviction of first degree murder.
The facts which differentiated Dorsey
and Garland, producing different result.
were as follows: The defendants in Dor-
sey were accused of first degree murder
and the defense did not raise the issue of
mitigation. On the other hand, in Gar-
land the defendant was convicted of
murder in the second degree and the de-
fense had raised the issue of mitigation.
The court held that the State need not
negate mitigation and that the trial judge
need not instruct the jury accordingly, if
the jury convicts the defendant of first
degree murder. By rendering a first de-
gree murder conviction, the jury decided
that there was premeditation on the part
of the defendant, with the presumption
of malice, thus relieving the State of its
burden of proving a lack of mitigation. In
Garland. however, the verdict of second
degree murder did not include the
malice presumption, since evidence of
mitigation was introduced by the de-
fense and was not negated by the State.
Right to a Jury Trial at the Cir-
cuit Court Level
In Thompson v. State, 278 Md. 41.
359 A.2d 203 (1976), the defendant
prayed a jury trial for adjudication of
charges of driving while intoxicated, driv-
ing while impaired, and spinning wheels.
When the case came before the Circuit
Court, the Assistant State's Attorney en-
tered a nolle prosequi on the driving
while intoxicated charge, The State then
contended that the remaining charges
were petty and as such, the defendant
was not entitled to a jury trial. Further,
the State alleged that the case should be
returned to the District Court. The Court
of Special Appeals affirmed the Circuit
Court's decision in denying a jury trial.
Thompson v. State, 26 Md. App. 442,
338 A.2d 411 (1975). After granting cer-
tiorari to determine Thompson's right to
a jury trial or whether the charges should
have been returned for trial in the District
Court, the Court of Appeals held that the
District Court rule, relied on by the lower
court, which prevents a defendant from
praying a jury trial on petty offenses, no
longer applies when a case gets to the
Circuit Court.
Rule 741 of the Maryland Rules of
Procedure is applicable in Circuit Court,
where all defendants, without exception
as to petty offenses, are entitled to a trial
by jury. The Court further stated that if




by Peter H. Meyers
(Reprinted, with permission, from The Leaf-
let, A publication of the National Organiza-




How much help can police agents give in
the commission of a crime and still be
able to prosecute successfully after-
wards? That question recently split the
U.S. Supreme Court three ways in a
case that has narrowly defined the limits
of entrapment and other related de-
fenses.
The case, Hampton v. United States,
44 U.S.L.W. 4542 (April 27, 1976), in-
volved an undercover DEA agent who
had supplied Hampton with heroin and
then arranged for him to sell it to other
DEA agents. After Hampton made two
sales, he was arrested and convicted for
distributing heroin.
A five-Justice majority of the Supreme
Court, in affirming Hampton's convic-
tion, limits the defense of entrapment to
the rule it may do so, but until then the
Thompson case applies.
In Howard v. State, 32 Md. App. 75,
A2d 568 (1976), the defendant was
charged with disturbing the peace, as-
sault, and obstructing a police officer.
The defendant was to be tried in District
Court, which had concurrent jurisdiction
with the Circuit Court. However, the de-
fendant prayed a jury trial under the
provisions of the Cts. & Jud. Proc. Art.
§4-302 (d)(2). The issue was whether
the demand for a juy trial on the latter
two offenses also deprived the District
Court of its original exclusive jurisdiction
t t
situations where government agents
"implant" the criminal design in the
mind of an innocent person. Entrapment
cannot be claimed when government
agents encourage or act in concert with
an individual who was "predisposed" to
commit an offense, as Hampton's attor-
ney had conceded he was.
However, entrapment is not the only
defense which can be raised when police
participate in the commission of a crime.
Two justices who voted to affirm
Hampton's conviction-Powell and
Blackmun-indicated in a separate opin-
ion that they would bar the prosecution
of a "predisposed" defendant when
"police overinvolvement in the crime
[reached] a demonstrable level of out-
rageousness," based upon due process
principles or the Court's supervisory
powers. The three dissenting justices-
Brennan, Stewart, and Marshall-
agreed that outrageous police involve-
ment would bar prosecution, forming a
slender five-justice majority for this prin-
ciple. The dissenters would have gone
further, and reversed Hampton's convic-
tion in this case because of the police in-
volvement, stating that in their view:
"The Government's role has passed
the point of toleration ... The Govern-
ment is doing nothing less than buying
contraband from itself through an inter-
mediary and jailing the intermediary."
The other three justices who voted to
affirm Hampton's conviction-
Rehnquist, White, and Chief Justice
Burger-indicated in a separate opinion
over the petty offense, i.e., disturbing the
peace.
Under the Thompson ruling, the
Court of Special Appeals decided that
the trial court in Howard erred by sever-
ing the petty charges from the other two
charges for which a jury trial was prayed.
The court stated that the Circuit Court
properly acquired jurisdiction over all
the offenses with which the defendant
was charged and that the defendant was
entitled to a jury trial on all charges, in-
cluding the petty charges when joined
originally with charges falling under C.J.
§4-302.
that they did not recognize any defense
beyond entrapment, and would not bar
the prosecution of a "predisposed" de-
fendant no matter how outrageous the
government's involvement was in the
commission of a crime. Justice Stevens
did not participate.
This decision is binding only on the
federal courts, and not the states. A
number of state courts have adopted





The U.S. Supreme Court has rejected
for the second time the defense of mem-
bers of a large communal group claiming
a right under the Free Exercise of Relig-
ion clause of the First Amendment to cul-
tivate marijuana for use in religious prac-
tices. In 1971, four members of the
group, including its spiritual leader,
Stephen Gaskin, were arrested and con-
victed for cultivating marijuana. All four
admitted growing marijuana, but argued
that marijuana was an integral part of the
religious practices at "the farm" a self-
sufficient spiritual community of about
800 individuals located in Summertown,
Tennessee.
After these convictions were affirmed
by the Tennessee Supreme Court, the
U.S. Supreme Court summarily dismis-
sed an appeal "for want of a substantial
federal question" in 1973, Gaskin v.
Tennessee, 414 U.S. 886. The four indi-
